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critical to the orderly functioning of the capital
markets, which is why this topic fits nicely into
the overall topic in the title to my lecture. Indeed,
I’ll emphasize just how important the Fed has
been in responding to the economic effects of
the terrorist attacks on September 11.
I’ve added a postscript that is off the topic,
but I know of interest—I’ll reflect a bit on the
likely implications of the terrorist attacks on the
economy.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. Robert Rasche, William Emmons, and Joel
James were especially helpful. However, I retain
full responsibility for errors.
NONFINANCIAL SECTORS USES
OF FUNDS
Almost everyone is aware of the fact that in
recent years the federal government has changed
from a net user to a net supplier of funds—the
federal budget has gone from deficit to surplus.
Of course, that situation is fluid today because of
the changed situation in the wake of the terrorist
attacks of September 11. It is too early to make
any projections as to just how large the change
in the federal budget will be in coming years.
Perhaps the most familiar fact about the fed-
eral role in the capital market is that the federal
budget went from near balance in 1970 to a deficit
of about 5 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s to a
T
he overall role of government in U.S.
capital markets is not prominent in
policy discussions, nor is it well under-
stood by the general public. There are
a number of important dimensions to this role
and significant changes over time. My purpose
today is to outline these dimensions to provide
a better understanding of the role of government.
The capital markets are the means by which
the economy’s saving flows to those who use the
saving. Business firms need access to some of
this saving to finance productive investment in
physical capital and to cover losses during the
start-up phase of new enterprises. Governments
use some of this saving to finance outlays in excess
of current revenues. Households tap some of this
saving to finance consumption outlays and, espe-
cially, housing investments. In the first part of
my lecture, I’ll outline some of the basic facts as
to how nonfinancial sectors use funds raised in the
capital markets and some of the notable changes
over time. I’ll emphasize how the government’s
role affects the outcome.
The financial system does not, however, trans-
fer all funds directly from savers to end users of
funds. A large fraction of saving flows through
financial intermediaries, such as banks and mutual
funds. The government’s role in the intermedia-
tion process is substantial. That will be the sub-
ject of the next section of my lecture.
In the final section of my lecture, I’ll reflect
on the Federal Reserve’s role in the financial sys-
tem. The Fed reflects an important governmental
influence, but one more involved in the overall
management of the economy than directly in the
capital markets. Nevertheless, the Fed’s role issurplus of about 2½ percent last year. Because
that fact is so familiar, I’ll not dwell on it.
Less well-known is the use of the credit mar-
kets by the state and local governments. These
governments have borrowed funds on a smaller
and steadier scale than the federal government
for many decades. Their net new borrowing each
year was equivalent to about 1 percent of GDP
through the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. State and
local government borrowing spiked briefly above
2 percent of GDP in the mid-1980s, before falling
back to about zero by the mid-1990s. The most
recent evidence suggests state and local borrowing
is set to resume its previous pace equivalent to
about 1 percent of GDP for the immediate future.
Because of this relatively steady pace of bor-
rowing, the total amount of state and local govern-
ment debt outstanding has remained between 8
and 18 percent of GDP for the entire post-war
period, with no apparent trend in either direction.
For example, state and local government debt
was equivalent to 14.5 percent of GDP in 1970,
16.1 percent in 1985, and then returned to 13.0
percent by 2000.
State and local governments not only raise
funds in the capital markets but also are important
lenders. Data on lending by state and local govern-
ments to nonfinancial borrowers are fragmentary,
and evidence on the amount of such activity is
limited to recent years. This activity is best sum-
marized by public debt issued for private pur-
poses, as defined by the Bureau of the Census
since fiscal year 1987-88. The data refer to debt
issued by state and local governments or their
agencies for the purpose of funding private sector
activities. Examples of activities supported by
such lending activities include industrial and
commercial development; pollution control;
housing and mortgage loans; private hospital
facilities; student loans; and ventures such as
sports stadiums, convention centers, and shop-
ping malls. For fiscal year 1987-88, the outstand-
ing amount of such debt was $246.2 billion, or
approximately 5 percent of GDP, split equally
between state governments and local governments.
By fiscal year 1996-97, the latest period for which
complete data are available, the outstanding
amount had grown to $328.2 billion—a bit less
than 4 percent of GDP—of which 60 percent was
issued by state government units. In recent years,
state and local governments have been a much
more important source of direct loans to nonfinan-
cial borrowers than has the federal government.
Governments not only directly absorb or pro-
vide saving to the capital market but also influence
the use and form of capital raised by the private
sector. Of particular note is the growing use of
debt over equity by corporate business. For a
corporation, debt has the advantage that interest
payments are deductible under the corporate
income tax law, whereas dividend payments are
not. Perhaps as a consequence of this feature of
the tax law, or at least in part, the equity portion
of capital for nonfarm, nonfinancial businesses
has fallen from 64 percent in 1970 to 50 percent
today. A possible downside aspect of this trend
is that it makes corporations more vulnerable to
bankruptcy should economic conditions deterio-
rate significantly, and that in turn may make the
overall economy less stable.
Beyond its direct role in raising capital in the
market, the government regulates competitive
conditions in the securities markets. Since the
enactment of federal securities laws in the 1930s,
the emphasis has been to provide investors with
information, and not for the government itself to
make judgments as to investment merit. This
system has worked well, and most investors
understand that the government does not substi-
tute its own judgments for those of investors.
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION
The flow of saving from the original saver,
such as a household, to the ultimate user of the
saving, such as a corporation, can take the form
of household purchases of newly issued common
stock or corporate bonds. However, a large fraction
of saving flows is intermediated by financial
firms. The classic example is the commercial
bank, which collects funds from depositors and
lends to both businesses and households.
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important functions. An obvious one is that the
intermediary specializes in the analysis of risk
and administration of loans. Very few households
have the lending expertise that banks do. More-
over, banks can attract funds in small amounts
from individuals and make large loans to business
firms.
The government role in supervising, regulat-
ing, and insuring financial intermediaries is much
more extensive than its role in the securities
markets in which stocks and bonds are traded.
The federal role regarding financial intermediaries
ranges from minimal, as with firms such as GE
Capital, to extensive, as with regulation of com-
mercial banks and insurance of deposits.
Of all the federal guarantee arrangements,
deposit insurance is the most fully developed
and best understood. In the United States, deposit
insurance arrangements began in the early-19th
century. Through a long and painful evolution,
including creation of federal deposit insurance in
the 1930s and the collapse of the Federal Savings
and Loan Insurance Corporation in 1989, the
management of the deposit insurance system is
now fairly well understood. There are two pillars
to the system. One is extensive regulation and
supervision of insured depository institutions by
federal and state agencies. The second is the
requirement that insured institutions maintain
substantial capital, which provides a cushion
against losses and an incentive for the owners to
manage their institutions carefully.
Deposit insurance serves an important func-
tion in improving the stability of the financial
system. However, it creates the risk that insured
depository institutions will engage in unsafe
lending practices that may lead to loan defaults
and bank failures. An inadequate insurance sys-
tem sooner or later is likely to lead to excessive
taxpayer losses.
Federal insurance programs that cover liabili-
ties of private financial intermediaries date from
the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in the 1930s.
In 1970, credit union shares became insured
throughtheNationalCreditUnionShareInsurance
Fund. The FSLIC was abolished in 1989, and
responsibility for insuring deposits of banks and
thrifts was assigned to the FDIC through two
separate funds, the Bank Insurance Fund and the
Thrift Insurance Fund. As of the end of 1999,
deposits insured by the two FDIC funds exceeded
$2.8 trillion, about 71 percent of all deposits at
insured banks and 93 percent of all deposits at
insured thrifts. In addition, the National Credit
Union Administration insured $326 billion dollars
in credit union shares.
The statutory responsibility of the FDIC
extends only to the first $100,000 of deposits
held by a particular individual in all accounts at
a depository institution. However, as a conse-
quence of the bailout of Continental-Illinois Bank
in 1984, it became clear that in practice the govern-
ment was following what the market usually
calls a “too-big-to-fail” policy, but which is more
properly called a “too-big-to-liquidate-quickly”
policy. Whatever term is used, the policy means
that for large banks all deposits, and not just
insured deposits, may be guaranteed; clearly
though, shareholders and managements are
vulnerable to loss. The extent of this de facto
extension of government insurance of depository
liabilities beyond the statutory provisions has
never been precisely defined. In the event of
problems at another large bank, the markets will
be uncertain of the extent to which the government
will cover losses that large, uninsured depositors
might suffer.
Another class of financial intermediaries is
government-sponsored enterprises, or GSEs.
These are instrumentalities of the federal govern-
ment and not fully private. They are established
and chartered by the federal government to
accomplish specific policy goals. However, they
may have private shareholders who receive divi-
dends and enjoy most of the rights of fully private
firms. The mission of the housing GSEs—includ-
ing Fannie Mae (originally named the Federal
National Mortgage Corporation), and Freddie Mac
(originally the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation) and the Federal Home Loan Bank
System—is to facilitate the flow of credit to mort-
The Role of Government in U.S. Capital Markets
3gage borrowers. In addition to the housing GSEs,
other financial GSEs include the Farm Credit
System, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corpor-
ation (Farmer Mac), the Financing Corporation
and the Refinancing Corporation (both set up to
resolve failed savings and loans in the early 1990s),
and the Student Loan Marketing Association
(Sallie Mae). There are also non-financial GSEs
such as the Post Office and the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
All of the financially oriented GSEs together
controlled financial assets of $2.125 trillion at
the end of the second quarter of 2001, with the
lion’s share accounted for by the three housing
GSEs. A major activity of the housing GSEs is to
purchase mortgage loans from originators like
commercial and mortgage banks, and then pack-
age them in the form of mortgage-backed securi-
ties, which are guaranteed and sold to investors.
The pool of outstanding government-related
mortgage securities amounted to $2.636 trillion
at the end of the second quarter of 2001. This
figure includes mortgage-backed securities from
Ginnie Mae, the Veterans Administration, and
the Federal Housing Authority, which are not
GSEs but instead are agencies of the federal gov-
ernment carrying the full faith and credit of the
government.
Direct government lending to financial inter-
mediaries, which is quite small today, dates from
the creation of the discount facility as part of the
Federal Reserve Act, which became law in 1913.
In the early years of the Federal Reserve System,
such loans were an important source of funds to
member banks. In the past decade, except during
episodes of financial stress, such as experienced
in the days following the September 11 terrorist
attacks, the outstanding amount of such loans
has been very small. With the exception of the
seasonal borrowing facility, the maturities of
such loans are very short.
Another significant federal guarantee program
arises through government insurance of defined
benefit pension plans, through the Pension Benefit
Guarantee Corporation. The PBGC was created
by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974. On September 30, 1998, the present
value of covered defined benefit pension plans
was estimated at $12.3 billion.
In discussing financial intermediaries and
federal guarantee programs, I have mentioned
dollar amounts in the trillions. The scale of the
programs is comparable to the publicly held
Treasury debt—often called the “national debt”—
which we also measure in the trillions. These
programs have significant effects on the capital
markets and raise many fascinating and difficult
public policy issues.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S ROLE
No financial system works well, as experience
around the world has demonstrated often and
painfully, in the face of monetary instability. In
the United States, the Federal Reserve has the
essential responsibility of maintaining low infla-
tion and confidence that low inflation will con-
tinue into the indefinite future. Without that
confidence, the bond market will have a tough
time pricing long-term bonds, because the future
purchasing power of money will be uncertain. In
countries experiencing high inflation, long-term
debt instruments literally disappear. Funds can
only be borrowed short term, if at all.
The importance of the Federal Reserve’s role
in the payments system became fully evident on
September 11 and the days immediately follow-
ing. The Fed provided an enormous amount of
extra liquidity to the financial system. The action
was not a monetary policy action in the conven-
tional sense, but a response to the physical dis-
ruption of the payments system.
To understand what the Fed did, consider
your situation if your income stopped, you were
unable to borrow funds, and you were unable to
sell securities because the markets were closed.
Depending on your access to cash, you would be
forced, within a few days, to default on bills com-
ing due. Both nonfinancial and financial firms
are in a similar situation, except that financial
firms especially rely heavily on daily and even
hourly receipts to meet obligations to make pay-
ments of various sorts.
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securities markets closed, and so funds could not
be raised that way. Moreover, the attack caused
serious disruption to the operations of several
financial firms that play a prominent role in clear-
ing payments. Without certain funds coming in,
firms all over the United States, and all over the
world for that matter, would have been forced to
default on obligations. Let me emphasize that
the funds due were indeed owed to the recipient
firms; the problem was that the physical destruc-
tion and unavoidable delays in bringing backup
systems and locations to full operational capacity
meant that the funds simply could not be trans-
mitted. In the absence of Fed intervention, we
would have seen a cascade of defaults as firms
due funds that were not arriving would be unable
to meet their obligations. This default cascade
would have spread the problem throughout the
world economic system.
The Fed provided extra liquidity to the mar-
kets in a variety of ways after the terrorist attacks.
One method was by making loans through the
discount window to depository institutions. Such
loans usually run a few hundred million dollars
or so. On Wednesday, September 12 the out-
standing volume of adjustment credit lent by the
Fed to depository institutions rose to $45.5 bil-
lion, up from $99 million the Wednesday before.
Those loans allowed banks to meet their obliga-
tions, even though expected receipts had not
arrived, and allowed banks to extend credit to
their customers who could then make payments.
A large increase in Federal Reserve float was
another mechanism expanding liquidity. The Fed
typically clears roughly one-third of the checks
generated by the households and businesses that
write them. In the normal course of business, a
bank receiving a check may take it to the Fed,
which then processes the check and sends it on
to the bank on which it was written. The dollar
amount of the check is added to the clearing
account of one bank and deducted from the
account of the other bank. These clearing accounts
are maintained on the books of the Federal
Reserve Banks.
Because many checks are transported by air,
the grounding of all aircraft meant that checks
deposited with the Fed for clearing could not be
delivered to the banks on which they were drawn.
Moreover, many banks that do not ordinarily
use the Fed’s check-processing services brought
their checks to the Fed for a few days after
September 11. For both regular customers and
these new customers, the Fed gave credit for the
balances deposited that vastly exceeded the
funds being deducted from the accounts of other
banks; the difference is called “Federal Reserve
float.” On Wednesday, September 12, float was
$22.9 billion, up from $2.1 billion the previous
Wednesday.
A third mechanism to inject liquidity into
the banking system was Fed purchases of securi-
ties in the open market. Fortunately, the market
mechanism, though severely impaired, was not
completely broken. The Open Market Desk at the
New York Fed, itself operating from a contingency
site because its office near the World Trade Center
was closed, was able to purchase a large volume
of securities through a combination of outright
purchases and temporary purchases under repur-
chase agreements. Moreover, the Fed arranged
currency swap agreements with several foreign
central banks, which enabled them to provide
dollars to their financial institutions.
Allthesemechanismstakentogetherexpanded
Federal Reserve credit by $90 billion, or about
15 percent, between Wednesday, September 5
and Wednesday, September 12. As the financial
system restored normal payments mechanisms,
and securities markets reopened, the extra liquid-
ity flowed back to the Federal Reserve. Loans at
the discount window were repaid, float declined
as checks cleared, and Open Market Desk pur-
chases of securities under repurchase agreement
expired.Today,thesystemisfunctioningnormally.
One other aspect of Fed operations deserves
mention in this context. On the afternoon of
September 11, and to a lesser extent during the
days that followed, some banks experienced a
modest increase in demand for currency.
Frightened depositors withdrew cash from teller
windows and ATMs. If those sources of cash had
The Role of Government in U.S. Capital Markets
5run dry, the word would have spread rapidly that
cash was running out, and additional people
would have lined up at ATMs to make their with-
drawals. The Fed made clear to depository insti-
tutions that cash was available and maintained
operations to ensure that all demands could be
met. A modest amount of extra cash was shipped
to banks requesting it. I personally heard of no
ATMs running dry, and in a matter of a few days
the extra demand for cash disappeared. Here
again, the Fed’s role was to maintain normal
functioning of the payments system, and by doing
so the Fed helped to maintain public confidence
in difficult and uncertain circumstances.
Federal Reserve payments system operations
are ordinarily considered a rather mundane sub-
ject. This experience shows, however, that under
conditions of stress the subject is far from mun-
dane. A modern economy depends critically on
reliable methods to make and receive payment;
when those mechanisms fail, the economy itself
cannot function. The crisis of September 11 shows
that the Federal Reserve plays an important role
in keeping the mechanics of the payments system
in good order. Doing so builds confidence across
the economy that this essential aspect of life will
work in normal fashion.
CONCLUDING COMMENT
The capital markets play a central role in a
market economy. In the United States, these mar-
kets have a heavy governmental presence, but one
that has evolved to differing degrees of govern-
ment involvement depending on the market being
examined. For the most part, government involve-
ment in the primary security markets is relatively
limited. The federal and state and local govern-
ments do raise significant amounts of funds in
these markets, but the regulatory function is con-
centrated in the area of requiring provision of
accurate information.
Financialintermediariesplayasignificantrole.
They raise funds from a variety of sources and
make loans of many types. The federal involve-
ment with intermediaries ranges from a light
touch to extensive regulation and supervision.
POSTSCRIPT
I chose my lecture topic long before
September 11 and had in hand a great deal of
background work. But I think it would be a mis-
take for me to stop now without commenting
briefly on the likely economic effects of the ter-
rorist attacks.
The long-run prospects for the U.S. economy
remain basically unaffected. The dynamic nature
of the economy has not been damaged. The
prospects for innovation, and the incentives to
employ new technologies, have not changed.
The short-run outlook is dominated by uncer-
tainty. Forecasters, required by their profession
to put down numbers, show a much wider range
of views than usual. I know that every individual
forecaster has even less confidence than usual in
the numbers written down. The fact is that we
have no close parallel in U.S. history to study for
guidance as to the likely course of the economy
in the months and quarters ahead. Moreover, as
the anthrax situation so horribly illustrates, we
may have additional unpleasant surprises ahead
of us.
Some business analysts seem to use the word
“uncertainty” as a euphemism for “weakness,“
just as stock market analysts seem to use the word
“volatility” as a euphemism for “decline.” What
I mean by uncertainty is that likely outcomes for
the aggregate economy over the next six to twelve
months are spread across a range from modestly
poor to modestly good. Without question, the
terrorist attacks have hurt the aggregate economy
over the near-term. However, I do want to empha-
size that we have very considerable strengths in
our situation. We should not be pessimistic. I am
not saying that I have a personal forecast of a
quick rebound, but at the same time neither do I
have a sinking feeling. I am genuinely uncertain
about the economy’s near-term outlook.
What are the strengths of the economy today?
Most important, we have a resilient people who
are not going to sit back and watch the situation
deteriorate. We are a people who look ahead and
do not allow ourselves to wallow in fear. We are
already acting to address the problems we face.
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responsive to changing circumstances. We already
see the airlines adjusting rapidly, by cutting
routes where necessary and adjusting fares down-
ward to attract passengers. Auto companies have
zero-interest rate promotions, and indeed auto
sales in early October have been strong. Market
after market is responding and adjusting.
The rate of inflation is low and expected to
remain low. In many past periods of stress, rising
inflation expectations have complicated the situ-
ation tremendously. When the Korean War broke
out in June 1950, there were immediate fears of a
surge of inflation and of goods shortages. Many
hoarded goods, and prices spiked up quickly,
unsettling the situation.
The U.S. banking system is strong, unlike the
situation in August 1990 when the Gulf War broke
out. At that time, the economy drifted into reces-
sion, and the recovery that began officially in
March 1991 was anemic. Part of the problem then
was that a banking system with a weak capital
position was unable to expand loans even to many
credit-worthy borrowers. Today, bank capital is
strong and banks are able to lend to good risks.
A substantial amount of monetary and fiscal
policy stimulus was already in place before
September 11; additional monetary policy stim-
ulus is in place now, and more fiscal stimulus is
in the works.
Most analysts believe that lost business on
September 11 and the days that followed was
sufficient to nudge the economy’s growth rate in
the third quarter below zero. If the fourth quarter
is also down, then the conventional shorthand
definition of a recession—two successive quarters
with negative GDP growth—will be met. Some
talk as though that outcome is certain. It is not.
We should not be surprised if that is the outcome,
but neither should we be surprised if the fourth
quarter shows positive growth.
The Federal Reserve will be watching the
incoming data carefully, as will the market. If
necessary, more monetary policy ease will be put
in place. As data arrive suggesting revival of
growth, we’ll have to watch to be sure that we
are not observing a false dawn. We’ll also have to
be careful not to overstay policy ease.
You may not find the economist’s “on the
one hand, on the other hand” very satisfying, but
it sure beats a firm commitment to a policy course
oblivious to developing information. That is the
situation we face. We in the Fed are paid to exer-
cise our best judgment. That is what we will do.
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